Sudan accuses Ethiopia of hosting drone attacks from Asosa base in briefing to diplomats

Sudan has accused its neighbour Ethiopia of allowing its territory to be used to launch drone attacks on Sudanese towns and power stations, and of letting a base at Asosa become a supply hub for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The claims were put to foreign diplomats in Port Sudan in a briefing reported on Saturday, 31 October 2026. Ethiopia denies the claims, and the evidence Sudan cites has not been independently verified.

For ordinary people in Sudan, the row is about something much more immediate than diplomacy. The targets named by Sudanese officials are the systems that keep daily life running: power stations, water stations, fuel depots, schools and hospitals. When a power station is hit, homes go dark, water pumps stop, and hospitals run on generators, in a country already exhausted by more than three years of war.

At a glance

What happened: Sudan’s foreign ministry told diplomats in Port Sudan that a base at Asosa in western Ethiopia supplies the Rapid Support Forces and that Ethiopian territory is used to launch drone attacks on Sudan.
Why it matters: Sudan called the alleged attacks an act of aggression and part of a proxy war, while Ethiopia denies the claims, raising the risk of a wider dispute between two neighbours in the Horn of Africa.
What happens next: Diplomats will watch for Ethiopia’s response to this briefing, for any new evidence Sudan shares, and for whether talks between the two countries can lower the temperature.

What Sudan said in Port Sudan

The briefing was given by Muawiya Osman Khalid, the undersecretary of Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, speaking alongside the country’s security agencies to the diplomatic missions accredited to Sudan. Fana News, carrying a dispatch from the Sudan News Agency, known as SUNA, reported that Khalid said the briefing was meant to put the international community face to face with its responsibilities.

Khalid made three linked claims. First, he said a base at Asosa, inside Ethiopian territory, had become a hub for supplying the Rapid Support Forces, known as the RSF, with weapons and military equipment. Second, he said the same base was used to move foreign fighters and mercenaries into the war in Sudan. Third, he said Ethiopian bases and territory were being used as launching points for drone attacks against Sudan.

He said the attacks had intensified in recent months, hitting electricity generation facilities, water stations, schools, hospitals and fuel stations, and had resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries. He described the attacks as an act of aggression and as part of a proxy war being waged by Ethiopia on behalf of regional parties and countries, foremost among them the United Arab Emirates, with the RSF as its instrument.

Khalid paired the accusation with two softer messages. He said Sudan was making efforts to de-escalate tensions through diplomatic channels, and that Sudan retained its full right to respond to any aggression under international law. SUNA reported that the diplomats present had affirmed their countries’ support for Sudan’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The place at the centre of the claim: Asosa

Asosa is the capital of Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, in the west of the country, close to Sudan’s Blue Nile state. The Abay Times, reporting the briefing, noted that the region borders Sudan’s Blue Nile state. Asosa is a small regional centre, but its position on the map is what makes it important: the border runs through this area, and the roads and tracks that cross it have long been used by traders and travellers and, in wartime, by fighters and supplies.

Sudan’s claim is that a base at Asosa has become a hub for the RSF. In plain terms, a hub means a place where weapons and equipment are gathered and stored and then moved on, and where people can pass through on their way to the fighting. If that were true, the RSF would have a supply line running through a neighbouring country, a major advantage in a long war.

But it is important to be clear about what has and has not been shown. Sudan has not, in the public reports of this briefing, published evidence that would let an outside reader judge the Asosa claim, such as dated photographs of the base, named witnesses or documents. The reports describe what Khalid said, not what was proved. That does not mean the claim is false. It means it is, for now, an allegation from one government about another, and it should be read that way until independent evidence appears.

What happened in the days before the briefing

The Port Sudan briefing did not come out of nowhere. Three days earlier, Sudanese government and intelligence officials held a joint press conference in Khartoum, on Wednesday, 28 October 2026, at which they presented what they described as flight data, satellite imagery and fragments of intercepted drones. Addis Standard, reporting on that press conference, said the officials claimed the material showed drones launched from Ethiopian territory, including from Bahir Dar Airport, in Ethiopia’s Amhara region.

That press conference followed a wave of strikes on Sudan’s power grid. On Tuesday, 27 October, a drone attack disabled the Markhiyat power station, north-west of Omdurman, disrupting electricity supplies across the capital area. Further strikes on Wednesday, 28 October, targeted a power station and fuel storage facilities in El Manaqil, in Gezira State, as well as fuel storage sites and a pipeline linked to Bashayer Port in Red Sea State. The state electricity company blamed the strikes on RSF drones, and an army source said they were launched from Ethiopia, according to the reports.

The Eastleigh Voice, reporting the Khartoum press conference on 29 October, said drones believed to be linked to the RSF had targeted electricity stations in several Sudanese states over the previous three days. At the press conference, Khalid called the alleged launches a dangerous development that could undermine security and stability in the region. Ethiopia had not commented on those claims at the time, and the flight data and the alleged origin of the drones could not be independently verified.

The numbers Sudan put forward, and why they are still claims

At the Khartoum briefing on 28 October, Sudanese officials also put numbers on the alleged drone campaign. Conven.org, reporting that briefing, said officials claimed 162 drone attacks launched from Ethiopian territory had killed more than 400 civilians and 102 military personnel. They named 13 places they said had been targeted, including El Damazin, El Mazmum, Sennar, Kosti, Rabak, El Kurmuk, El Dinder, Wad El Mahi, El Obeid, Abu Oileila, Bara and Umm Rawaba, and said dozens of schools, fuel stations, health centres and hospitals had been destroyed.

The officials said the drones had been launched from bases in Asosa, Bahir Dar and other sites along the Sudanese border, following flight paths alongside South Sudan. They named several types of aircraft they said were used, including Chinese-made drones and the Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci and Bayraktar TB2.

These are large, specific numbers, and they deserve careful handling. They come from Sudanese officials, not from an independent count. No outside organisation has published its own tally that matches them, and the reports of the briefing themselves note that the claims have not been independently verified. The numbers cover a campaign over months, not a single incident, so they cannot be checked against one event. And the figure of more than 400 civilians and 102 military personnel, which together come to more than 500 people killed, sits beside the Port Sudan briefing’s vaguer language of hundreds of deaths and injuries, suggesting Sudanese officials are using round, approximate figures rather than a precise, verified list. Readers should treat the 162 attacks and the death toll as Sudan’s account, not as established fact, and the same applies to the drone types named.

What Ethiopia and the UAE say

Ethiopia has consistently rejected Sudan’s accusations. At the United Nations Security Council on 16 October 2026, Ethiopia’s ambassador rejected Sudan’s accusations as baseless, and said Ethiopia was addressing, through bilateral channels, what he called violations of its territory by some actors in Sudan’s war. Addis Ababa has previously denied supporting the RSF or allowing drones to be launched from its territory. The Abay Times reported that, by late on Saturday, 31 October, Ethiopia had not publicly responded to the Port Sudan briefing itself.

The United Arab Emirates has also denied supporting the RSF. Neither position has been proved in public.

This is not the first time Sudan has made such claims. In May 2026, Sudanese officials accused Ethiopia and the UAE of involvement in drone attacks on Khartoum airport and other strategic sites, saying the drones came from Ethiopia’s Amhara region. Ethiopia rejected those claims. Media reports in February 2026 suggested Ethiopia had hosted an RSF training camp near the border, claims Addis Ababa has not confirmed. Repetition could mean the pattern is real, but repetition is not proof.

Why drones and power stations matter

Drones are cheap compared with fighter jets, they can fly long distances, and they can hit a target without putting a pilot at risk. For the RSF, which has no traditional air force, drones are a way to reach deep into army-held territory, including the capital area. Defending against them is hard, because they are small and fly low.

Power stations are attractive targets because they are large, they cannot move, and hitting them hurts far more people than hitting a single military base. A power station supplies electricity to homes, hospitals, water pumps, factories and phone networks. When it stops working, water stops flowing because pumps need power, hospitals switch to generators that need fuel, and phone networks fail. Sudanese officials say the strikes are intended to prevent displaced people from returning to their homes, particularly in Khartoum. Whether or not that is the intention, the effect is real: people who might have gone home stay away when there is no power or water.

Sudan’s war began in April 2023, when tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF over plans to integrate the paramilitary force into the regular military escalated into open fighting. Sudan’s defence minister, Hassan Daoud Kabroun, has accused more than 20 countries of supporting the RSF, although in an interview with SUNA he did not name the countries beyond repeating the allegations against Ethiopia and the UAE, and he provided no evidence for the wider claim. A serious dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia, two of the largest countries in the Horn of Africa, would affect trade routes, refugees and the security of the Red Sea coast.

What to watch next

The first thing to watch is Ethiopia’s response to the Port Sudan briefing. A detailed denial, a call for a joint investigation, or silence will each send a different signal. A joint investigation would be the clearest way to test the claims, because it would let experts examine the flight data, satellite imagery and drone fragments Sudan says it holds.

The second thing to watch is whether Sudan shares more evidence, and whether the fighting continues. If the flight data and satellite imagery were published, with dates and flight paths that could be checked, independent experts could assess them. If drone strikes on power stations continue, Sudanese officials are likely to point to them as further proof. Sudan says it is trying to ease tensions through diplomatic channels, and Ethiopia has said it prefers bilateral channels to public accusations.

Frequently asked questions

What did Sudan accuse Ethiopia of?

Sudan accused Ethiopia of allowing a base at Asosa to supply the Rapid Support Forces with weapons and equipment, of letting foreign fighters and mercenaries pass through, and of allowing Ethiopian territory to be used to launch drone attacks on Sudan. Sudan described the alleged attacks as an act of aggression and part of a proxy war. Ethiopia denies the claims.

Where is Asosa, and why does it matter?

Asosa is the capital of Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, in western Ethiopia, close to Sudan’s Blue Nile state. Sudan says a base there has become a hub for supplying the RSF. Its location near the border is what makes the claim important, because it would mean the RSF had a supply line running through a neighbouring country.

When did Sudan make these claims?

Sudanese officials first made the claims in detail at a press conference in Khartoum on Wednesday, 28 October 2026, and then repeated them in a briefing for diplomats in Port Sudan reported on Saturday, 31 October 2026. Sudan had made similar accusations before, including in May 2026, and Ethiopia had rejected them each time.

How many people has Sudan said were killed?

At the Khartoum briefing on 28 October, Sudanese officials said 162 drone attacks had killed more than 400 civilians and 102 military personnel. The briefing in Port Sudan used vaguer language, speaking of hundreds of deaths and injuries. These figures come from Sudanese officials and have not been independently verified, so they should be treated as claims, not established facts.

What has Ethiopia said in response?

Ethiopia has repeatedly rejected the accusations as baseless and denied supporting the RSF or allowing drones to be launched from its territory. At the United Nations Security Council on 16 October 2026, Ethiopia’s ambassador rejected Sudan’s accusations. Ethiopia had not publicly responded to the Port Sudan briefing itself by late on 31 October.

What is the war in Sudan about?

The war began in April 2023, when tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces over plans to integrate the RSF into the regular military escalated into open fighting. Since then the two sides have fought across much of the country, millions of people have been displaced, and drones have become a central part of the fighting.

Conclusion

Sudan’s briefing in Port Sudan was a deliberate public step: a government telling the world’s diplomats, in plain terms, that it believes its neighbour is helping to attack it from the air. The claims are serious, specific and, if true, dangerous for the whole Horn of Africa. They are also, for now, unproven in public.

Take the suffering behind the claims seriously: power stations, hospitals and water stations really are being hit. At the same time, do not treat an accusation as a verdict. Ethiopia denies the claims, and the evidence has not been independently checked. The way forward runs through evidence and talks: publish the flight data, let independent experts examine the drone fragments, and give diplomacy a chance to find out what happened, and stop it happening again.

This article is for general information and education only. It is not legal or financial advice.

Sources

• https://www.fananews.com/language/en/sudan-briefs-diplomatic-missions-on-drone-attacks-launched-from-ethiopia/ (Fana News, carrying a Sudan News Agency dispatch, 31 October 2026)
• https://abaytimes.com/conflict/sudan-tells-diplomats-ethiopia-s-asosa-base-is-supplying-the-rsf (The Abay Times, 31 October 2026)
• https://addisstandard.com/sudan-once-again-accuses-ethiopia-of-involvement-in-drone-strikes-targeting-power-stations-civilian-sites/ (Addis Standard, 29 October 2026)
• https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/regional/417403/sudan-accuses-ethiopia-of-hosting-launch-platforms-for-drone-attacks-on-its-territory (The Eastleigh Voice, 29 October 2026)
• https://conven.org/sudan/news/sudan-accuses-ethiopia-of-launching-162-drone-attacks-from-its-territory/ (Conven.org, report of the 28 October 2026 Khartoum briefing; page undated as read)