Saudi Arabia Calls Reported $51 Billion Houthi Demand ‘Pure Fabrication’ as Yemen War Flares Again

Saudi Arabia has flatly denied a report that Yemen’s Houthi rebels demanded $51 billion and formal recognition as the country’s rulers in exchange for ending their attacks on the kingdom. A senior Saudi official called the claim “pure fabrication”, but the row has thrown a harsh light on a war that has flared back to life in Yemen — and on the vital shipping strait at the centre of it.

The Wall Street Journal reported on Thursday, 5 November, that Saudi Arabia had quietly approached the Houthis to find out what it would take to stop the fighting. Citing people briefed on the discussions, the newspaper said the group — formally known as Ansar Allah — had asked for $51 billion in compensation for years of Saudi airstrikes and a long blockade, and wanted Riyadh to recognise it as the ruler of Yemen. The report said other, smaller figures had also come up in the talks.

Within hours, Riyadh had pushed back hard. The denial, the background to the claim, and what it tells us about the state of the Yemen war are explained below.

What the Wall Street Journal reported

According to the Journal, Saudi Arabia reached out to the Houthis to explore whether a negotiated halt to hostilities was possible. The approach came after a difficult few months for the kingdom: Houthi forces had attacked Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea and seized territory overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb strait, the narrow waterway at the southern end of the Red Sea through which much of the world’s oil passes.

The newspaper, citing people briefed on the discussions, said the Houthis had put a price on peace: $51 billion, which they described as compensation for the damage caused by years of Saudi-led airstrikes and the blockade imposed on Yemen. On top of the money, the group wanted Saudi Arabia to formally recognise it as the legitimate ruler of Yemen.

The report also said that other compensation figures had been discussed, suggesting the $51 billion was a starting demand rather than a final figure. The Journal did not say whether Riyadh had made a counter-offer, and it did not name its sources.

Riyadh’s swift and angry denial

Saudi Arabia’s response was fast and blunt. Ambassador Rayed Krimly, the Deputy Minister for Public Diplomacy, rejected the report in a post on X on 5 November.

“I categorically deny the claims published by The Wall Street Journal regarding demands made by this militia. All of this is pure fabrication by the writers or their alleged sources,” he wrote.

Krimly went further, accusing the Houthis of turning against Yemen’s government, causing famine among the Yemeni people, and dragging the country into conflicts that did not serve Yemen or its population. He also accused the group of attacking commercial vessels in Red Sea waterways and of striking civilian and economic targets, and of rejecting every peace effort.

“We also remind the writers that Yemen has a recognised government,” he added — a pointed reminder that the Houthis, who control the capital Sanaa and much of northern Yemen, are not recognised internationally as the country’s government. That government, based in the south, is the one the United Nations and most countries deal with.

The denial was carried widely. The News in Pakistan, Dawn, the Yemen Monitor and other outlets all reported Krimly’s rejection on 5 and 6 November, and the story was picked up across the Middle East and South Asia.

Why the $51 billion figure matters

Whether or not the figure is real, it tells us something important about how the Houthis see themselves — and about how far apart the two sides are.

First, the money. Fifty-one billion dollars is an enormous sum. The Houthis presented it, according to the Journal, as payment for years of bombing and blockade. Saudi Arabia led a military coalition into Yemen in 2015, after the Houthis seized Sanaa, and the war that followed has been one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The Houthis clearly believe Riyadh owes them for the destruction. Riyadh clearly believes the opposite: that the Houthis are the aggressors, and that no payment is owed at all.

Second, the recognition. Money can be negotiated. Recognition is much harder. For Saudi Arabia to recognise the Houthis as the rulers of Yemen would mean abandoning the internationally recognised government it has supported for a decade, and accepting that an Iran-aligned armed group controls the country on its southern border. That is something Riyadh has never been willing to do, and Krimly’s reminder that “Yemen has a recognised government” was aimed squarely at that demand.

Third, the timing. The report and the denial came at a moment when the war in Yemen is heating up again, after more than four years of relative calm. A truce agreed in April 2022 had largely held, even though it was never turned into a full peace deal. That calm is now over.

How the Yemen truce fell apart

The road back to war was short, and it ran through the wider conflict gripping the Middle East.

The News, reporting on the Saudi denial, linked the renewed fighting to the wider regional conflict that flared in late February 2026, when the United States and Israel launched attacks on Iran and Tehran hit back with strikes across the region. Yemen, where the Houthis are aligned with Iran, was pulled into the wider confrontation.

The turning point for Yemen itself came in July. According to The News, the Houthis allowed an Iranian plane to land in defiance of Saudi control of Yemeni airspace. The Yemeni government answered by striking the airport. The exchanges that followed unravelled the 2022 truce.

On 20 July, the Houthis announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, warning that ships calling at Saudi ports would be treated as targets. Within days, tankers were being hit. The Saudi Press Agency said the tanker Encelia was struck on 22 July, with all crew safe. On 24 August, the Bahri supertanker Amzan was hit off Yanbu, Saudi Arabia’s key Red Sea oil port. In August, an attack on the cargo ship Tihamah in the Bab el-Mandeb strait killed at least six people, according to Yemen’s government.

On land, the Houthis advanced too. In September they seized the port city of Mokha after days of fighting, pushing their control down Yemen’s Red Sea coast towards the Bab el-Mandeb. By October, the Arab News reported that the group held Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline, including the strait itself. On 11 September, Houthi fighters crossed by boat to Mayyun Island, the small volcanic island that divides the strait into two shipping channels, and took it after government forces withdrew.

The fighting has continued into the autumn. On 27 October, the Saudi-led coalition said it had intercepted three Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at the kingdom’s Eastern Region and four drones heading for southern Saudi Arabia. No new merchant ship strike was reported in that incident, but it showed that the war is now being fought on two fronts: at sea and in the air over Saudi territory.

Saudi Arabia has already warned of the danger to its Yanbu oil hub as Houthi attacks continue, and the fighting has spread on land as well. In Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city, around one million people are trapped by a siege, and the United Nations has warned that time is running out.

The Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint: why the world should care

The Bab el-Mandeb — Arabic for the “Gate of Tears” — is one of the most important waterways in the world. It is the narrow strait, about 26 kilometres wide at its narrowest point, that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Ships passing through it are on their way to or from the Suez Canal, and with it, Europe.

Oil is the biggest cargo. Before the current crisis, millions of barrels of crude passed through the strait every day on their way from the Gulf to Europe and North America. When the Houthis began attacking ships in late 2023, many shipping companies rerouted their vessels around the southern tip of Africa — a journey thousands of kilometres longer, adding days to voyages and pushing up the cost of everything from fuel to food.

The 2026 blockade has made things worse. According to Lloyd’s List Intelligence, cargo transits through the strait stood at 1,215 vessels in September 2026 — 47 percent below pre-crisis levels. Suez Canal transits, at 1,228 in September, were up 21 percent on a year earlier but still 39 percent below the levels seen before the Houthi crisis began.

The cost is not only measured in ships. War-risk insurance for vessels in the region has soared, and freight rates for the largest oil tankers hit record levels in September. Saudi Arabia’s own oil exports have felt the strain: the kingdom’s crude shipments fell to around 6 million barrels a day in August, according to the International Energy Agency.

For ordinary people far from Yemen, the effect is simple: when a key shipping route becomes dangerous, goods cost more and arrive later. For the countries of the region, the stakes are higher still. Egypt depends on Suez Canal revenues. Saudi Arabia depends on getting its oil out through the Red Sea, especially now that the Strait of Hormuz — the other great oil chokepoint — is also disrupted by the wider regional war.

The view from Sanaa

The Houthis have not publicly confirmed or denied the $51 billion figure. Their public position, repeated through their spokesmen, is that they are fighting a defensive war against Saudi Arabia and that their naval blockade is a response to Saudi actions — a policy their military spokesman Yahya Saree has described as “siege for siege” and “escalation for escalation”.

The group has also drawn a careful line at sea. In September, it declared that maritime navigation was safe for all companies “with the exception of Saudi ships” — an attempt, it seemed, to keep the world’s shipping on side while squeezing Riyadh alone. Whether the world’s shipping lines believe that promise is another matter: insurers and shipowners have treated the whole strait as dangerous, not just Saudi-flagged vessels.

Inside Yemen, the war’s human cost continues to grow. The United Nations has long described Yemen as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with millions of people dependent on aid. The return to open fighting, the siege of cities like Taiz, and the disruption of shipping and aid routes can only make that worse.

What happens next

For now, there is no sign of a deal — reported, denied or otherwise. Saudi Arabia has said it cannot enter new peace negotiations while Houthi forces control the Bab el-Mandeb, according to the Middle East Monitor. That is a high bar: the Houthis now hold the strait, the island in the middle of it, and the entire coastline on the Yemeni side.

Meanwhile, the region’s alliances are hardening. Türkiye’s parliament ratified the Makkah defence pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on 6 November, by 279 votes to 119, and Saudi Arabia’s Defence Minister, Prince Khalid bin Salman, announced in October that the pact’s committee had agreed to activate collective deterrence measures. The message from Riyadh and its partners is that they are preparing for a long confrontation, not a quick settlement.

Several questions will decide what happens next. First, can the Saudi-led coalition push the Houthis back from the strait? Its ground offensive, Operation Dawn of Yemen, launched on 4 October, is aimed at the mainland coast — but no operation has targeted Mayyun Island itself. Second, will the Houthis keep their attacks limited to Saudi-linked shipping, or will a mistake at sea drag in other countries? Third, will anyone mediate? Iran’s foreign minister has offered to facilitate dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, but Riyadh has shown no interest in talks while the strait is in Houthi hands.

And then there is the $51 billion question itself. If the Journal’s report was accurate, it means Riyadh was willing, however quietly, to explore a price for peace — and the Houthis named a price Riyadh found impossible. If the report was wrong, as Krimly insists, it still shows how far apart the two sides are: one side’s idea of a settlement is the other side’s idea of a fabrication.

Either way, the denial has not ended the war. The ships are still rerouting, the missiles are still flying, and the strait that carries the world’s oil is still in the hands of a group that Saudi Arabia refuses to recognise. Until that changes, the $51 billion row will be remembered as the moment the world was reminded that Yemen’s war is back — and that it now runs through one of the most important waterways on earth.

Frequently asked questions

What did the Wall Street Journal report about the Houthis and Saudi Arabia?

The newspaper reported on 5 November 2026 that Saudi Arabia had approached the Houthis to explore a negotiated halt to hostilities, and that the group had demanded $51 billion in compensation plus formal recognition as Yemen’s rulers. The report cited people briefed on the discussions.

How did Saudi Arabia respond?

Ambassador Rayed Krimly, the Deputy Minister for Public Diplomacy, called the claims “pure fabrication by the writers or their alleged sources” in a post on X on 5 November, and said Yemen has a recognised government.

Who are the Houthis?

The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, are an armed group that controls Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and much of northern Yemen. They are aligned with Iran. Yemen’s internationally recognised government, based in the south, is backed by Saudi Arabia.

What is the Bab el-Mandeb strait and why does it matter?

It is the narrow waterway between Yemen and Djibouti that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Ships use it to reach the Suez Canal. Millions of barrels of oil passed through it daily before the crisis, and cargo transits are now 47 percent below pre-crisis levels, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence.

When did the Yemen truce collapse?

An informal truce agreed in April 2022 held for more than four years. It unravelled in July 2026, after the Houthis allowed an Iranian plane to land in defiance of Saudi control of Yemeni airspace and the Yemeni government struck the airport. The Houthis declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia on 20 July.

Is there any peace process under way?

Not at present. Saudi Arabia has said it cannot enter new peace negotiations while Houthi forces control the Bab el-Mandeb, and the Houthis have shown no sign of giving up the strait or the coastline they seized in September and October.

Sources

• The News (Pakistan) — “Riyadh rejects report of Houthis seeking billions for peace deal” (6 November 2026): https://www.thenews.pk/story/1447213-riyadh-rejects-report-of-houthis-seeking-billions-for-peace-deal
• Yemen Monitor — “Saudi Arabia Denies Report Claiming Houthis Demanded $51 Billion and Recognition to Halt Escalation in Yemen” (6 November 2026): https://www.yemenmonitor.com/en/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/187023
• Interbellum News — “Saudi Arabia Rejects Ansar Allah $51 Billion Claim as Fabrication”: https://interbellumnews.com/conflicts/ansar-allah-51-billion-claim-dismissed-by-saudi-arabia-as-fabrication
• Daily The Destination — “Saudi Arabia Dismisses WSJ Report on Houthi $51 Billion Demand” (6 November 2026): https://dailythedestination.com/saudi-arabia-dismisses-wsj-report-on-houthi-51-billion-demand/
• Alupetra — “Houthi Red Sea Attacks 2026: Bab el-Mandeb Shipping Data” (30 October 2026): https://www.alupetra.com/insights/houthi-red-sea-attacks-2026-bab-el-mandeb-shipping.html
• ShipUniverse — “A Second Shipping Chokepoint Is Heating Up: Houthis Advance Toward Bab el-Mandeb”: https://www.shipuniverse.com/news/a-second-shipping-chokepoint-is-heating-up-houthis-advance-toward-bab-el-mandeb/
• House of Saud — “Houthis Hold Mayyun Island, Bab el-Mandeb Transits Down 47%”: https://houseofsaud.com/houthi-bab-el-mandeb-chokepoint/

This article is for general information and education only. It is not legal or financial advice.